I don't find the concept of minds being emergent properties or functions to be unreasonable given we find emergentism occurring everywhere else. For example, photosynthesis emerges from things that are not themselves photosynthesizing, and so on.
Humans seem fascinated with the specialness of our own minds, to the point where "conscious" becomes some ontological differentiator, but there's no reason to assume they are not just another very cool phenomena like anything else. Spend enough time around people with brain damage and the concept of "mind is located in the brain but does not come from the brain" seems like a dodge that again would never be entertained for any other phenomenon.
Perhaps it may be useful to differentiate consciousness itself from the rest of the mind (cognition, memory, emotion, etc.) because people often try to bootstrap the former as a fundamental aspect of reality (which is possible!) to preserve the eternity of the latter (i.e. their ego).
Photosynthesis is a process though, and not a property. You wouldn't say a plant "is" or "possesses" photosynthesis, but that it's something they do.
Perhaps my presentation of it has erased this, but Draper's theory makes no distinction between an animal mind and a human mind. There's nothing inherently anthropocentric about the theory.
The mind is a process as well...in fact that term suits it better than "property" (and that may have been the term I was reaching for originally).
I tend to agree with Draper in that human and animal minds differ more in degree than kind. Any speculation about consciousness as an inherent property of the universe (or fundamental principle, or ground of intelligibility as per Trenton Colley, see: https://philarchive.org/rec/COLTGO-7) would have to look at primary consciousness, rather than specific cognitive abilities, personality, or even self-awareness (secondary consciousness).
For consciousness to be a process, that would be a denial of one (or more) points of the quadrilemma. In Aetherism, consciousness is fundamental. There's nothing wrong with denying a point and adopting the corresponding view, but Draper's theory provides a "fifth way" in his own words. I only meant to compare his fifth way to the Orphic worldview.
Fair enough, and I suppose I do deny the quadrilemma...although I think consciousness is indeed still fundamental, albeit more in the manner that Colley describes.
I don't find the concept of minds being emergent properties or functions to be unreasonable given we find emergentism occurring everywhere else. For example, photosynthesis emerges from things that are not themselves photosynthesizing, and so on.
Humans seem fascinated with the specialness of our own minds, to the point where "conscious" becomes some ontological differentiator, but there's no reason to assume they are not just another very cool phenomena like anything else. Spend enough time around people with brain damage and the concept of "mind is located in the brain but does not come from the brain" seems like a dodge that again would never be entertained for any other phenomenon.
Perhaps it may be useful to differentiate consciousness itself from the rest of the mind (cognition, memory, emotion, etc.) because people often try to bootstrap the former as a fundamental aspect of reality (which is possible!) to preserve the eternity of the latter (i.e. their ego).
Photosynthesis is a process though, and not a property. You wouldn't say a plant "is" or "possesses" photosynthesis, but that it's something they do.
Perhaps my presentation of it has erased this, but Draper's theory makes no distinction between an animal mind and a human mind. There's nothing inherently anthropocentric about the theory.
The mind is a process as well...in fact that term suits it better than "property" (and that may have been the term I was reaching for originally).
I tend to agree with Draper in that human and animal minds differ more in degree than kind. Any speculation about consciousness as an inherent property of the universe (or fundamental principle, or ground of intelligibility as per Trenton Colley, see: https://philarchive.org/rec/COLTGO-7) would have to look at primary consciousness, rather than specific cognitive abilities, personality, or even self-awareness (secondary consciousness).
For consciousness to be a process, that would be a denial of one (or more) points of the quadrilemma. In Aetherism, consciousness is fundamental. There's nothing wrong with denying a point and adopting the corresponding view, but Draper's theory provides a "fifth way" in his own words. I only meant to compare his fifth way to the Orphic worldview.
Fair enough, and I suppose I do deny the quadrilemma...although I think consciousness is indeed still fundamental, albeit more in the manner that Colley describes.